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Linda Carozza wishes to move our attention away from the epistemic roles that emotions 
might play to the ways in which they help to form the world we share. 
 
In dealing with the “emotional” aspects of argument, I [want] to avoid overly philosophical or 
psychological definitions of the term, mostly because this project is aimed at any individual in the 
process of recognizing, mapping, analyzing, handling, facilitating, and/or solving emotional 
arguments.  The cognitive or physiological aspects of emotion, for instance, are not that significant 
for argumentation.  What is important to note about emotion is that it is part and parcel to the 
social sphere.  Alison M. Jaggar writes that emotions are ‘…wrongly seen as necessarily passive 
or involuntary responses to the world.  Rather, they are ways in which we engage actively and 
even construct the world.’ (Carozza, 2007, 6-7) 
 
It is this move from the cognitive to the social, presumably, that Carozza expresses as she 
acquaints her readers with the Social Styles Model of emotional presentation or presence 
in communicative contexts of argumentation.  This move deserves the expenditure of a 
bit of time and effort by way of offering some comments on Carozza’s interesting paper.  
There are some unanswered questions to think about concerning first what this move is, 
secondly what it might accomplish, and third what commitments it brings. 
 
2. LEAVING THE COGNITIVE, FINDING THE SOCIAL IN EMOTIVE ARGUMENT 
 
So then, first, what precisely is this move that Carozza is making?  To be sure, on the 
surface it is a matter of calling our attention to the ways in which emotion has been noted 
to be part of argument—namely by revealing what the arguers believe or are ready to 
infer and how strongly they feel about all of this.  In addition, emotion plays a central role 
in generating exchanges of the sort of appeal to pity or of scare tactic.  Still, all of this 
seems only too clearly to be a set of cognitive points about how emotions can reveal the 
grounds, warrant, qualifications, or patterns of inference involved in an argument.  Here 
“cognitive” means or suggests “bearing on the epistemic aspects of arguments.”  And 
then yes, emotion can give us access to things we must know in order to properly deal 
with arguments.  But that is just the point for here—these are things we must know about 
what are the evidence, the inference patterns, or else the persuasive forces of an argument 
CHARLES V. BLATZ 
and as such are not clearly ‘part and parcel of the social’.  So let us try again.  What 
precisely is this move that Carozza is inviting us to make? 
Maybe the clue is found in Jaggar’s urging that emotions are “ways in which we 
engage actively and even construct the world”?  Carozza would certainly not be the first 
to think in this way of emotions as having an active role in creating a social world, of 
interest for the place it affords argumentation.  For example, consider a statement by Max 
Scheler: 
 
On the contrary, there is a type of experiencing whose “objects” are completely inaccessible to 
reason; reason is as blind to them as ears and hearing are blind to colors.  It is a kind of experience 
that leads us to genuinely objective objects and the eternal order among them, i.e. to values and the 
order of ranks among them and the order and laws contained in this experience are as exact and 
evident as those of logic and mathematics; that is, there are evident interconnections and 
oppositions among values and value-attitudes and among the acts of preferring, etc. which are 
built upon them, and on the basis of these a genuine grounding of moral decisions and laws for 
such decisions is both possible and necessary.  (Scheler 1973, 255) 
 
And what type of experience would that be?  It is the experience of the heart or, that is, 
the emotions.  Could this be what Carozza is hinting at in her attention to the social and 
not the cognitive?  This seems an unlikely prospect since Jaggar’s talk of construction of 
the world does not rest easily with Scheler’s intended absolutism.  Scheler’s reference to 
the moral order is suggestive however. 
There is, of course, a multitude of lines of thought according to each of which the 
emotions construct moral orders.  (Arguably the line stretches from David Hume, to John 
Stuart Mill, to F.H. Bradley and W.D. Ross, to Peter Strawson and John McDowell, to 
Henri Bergson, to Gilles Deleuze, and on.)  And, it is not at all unusual for part of the 
claim defining such views to be that in generating the moral order, emotions, to some 
greater or lesser degree, create the “social sphere.”  But while this might put us on the 
right track, it does not help much to clear up why Carozza should consider this a matter 
linking emotion to argument.  Perhaps the answer is close at hand however.   
We construct the world through emotions thereby constructing the social realm.  
But is this construction a matter of argument or not?  Surely it is a construction through 
forming and articulating reasons and a construction that proceeds through reason giving.  
But is this reason giving that is itself constitutive of argumentation?  As Damasio claimed 
and Carozza quotes, “—we feel the right responses and act accordingly in a given 
situation, and at the same time we tend to know when we implement the wrong 
responses.” (Carozza, 2007, 7)  If this is right we are acting for reasons making 
discriminations in an orderly fashion, and we know in terms of reasons that or when our 
responses are wrong.  Reasons seem to come along with and indeed from the moral 
sphere.  As well, they are somehow marshaled to the determination of right and wrong.  
Also, this use of reasons comes along with argumentation in which we present and defend 
ourselves to others as doing or having done right or wrong—thence argumentation.  But 
the question this raises is whether this gives us a different take than the cognitive on “the 
‘emotional’ aspects of argumentation”?  (Carozza, 2007, 6)  I must confess that I am not 
at all sure that I am still speaking within the spirit of what Carozza intends.  But if I am, 
then perhaps in that spirit I can offer a different take on emotive argumentation than what 
might be suggested by the cognitive or by what is standardly associated with the 
cognitive. 
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3. CREATING THE GIST OF THE WORLD, INTEGRATIVE EMOTIVE 
ARGUMENTATION  
 
The emotions construct the world thereby bringing us to a social sphere.  They do this 
first by making of the world a landscape of saliencies.  The emotions make the world 
ours; make it something of significance to us.  And in doing so the emotions construct a 
world in terms of what each of us understands, values, and then makes of it, the world 
according to …; the world that is the gist of our personal, continuing experience and the 
gist of our understanding of what significance lies behind our actions at any and every 
moment.  This world is changeable in some part—as we would expect it to be in so far as 
it is the construction of our emotions.  Further, this world positions us in relation to others 
and to the gist of their salienced experience; and in turn it positions their world in relation 
to ours.  These differing loci of significance are often differing loci of conflicting 
significance, and then are often the occasions of argumentation in the familiar sense of 
marshalling evidence on behalf of a conclusion.  But this tie of emotions to familiar 
argumentative exchanges, a tie made through the creation of a social sphere, is not the 
point.  Rather we need to take note of the other, different notion of argumentation just 
introduced.  Creating the gist of things is as much an exercise of thought, indeed as much 
an exercise of reason in argumentation as is giving reasons for a conclusion in the more 
standardly “cognitive” notion of argumentation—different forms of argumentation to be 
sure, but both forms of argumentation nonetheless. 
Creating the gist of things is a matter of bringing out the significance and sense 
we feel of who and where we are and of how things are going, as this is registered 
through our emotional responses operating as one form of running commentary in our 
living.  But it is more.  This sense of who and where we are and how well we are doing is 
not a matter of several and sundry determinations of the gist of our experience.  It is a 
sense of the whole and of the significance found in the ebb and flow of our actions and 
experiences.  Thus, to bring out the gist of things in our life, or the gist of our world, is 
not a matter of analysis, or for that matter of a synthesis of separate elements or 
compartments of our life, or moments of our experience, much less a synthesis of our 
understanding of several separable objects or the states of these, as we experience them, 
apart from their environment.  The gist of things is rather an overall grasp and intuitive 
understanding we have; a sense of the significance permeating that world as grasped 
within the flow of our life.  As such, the gist of things is one form of attention we bear on 
our living in the world.  (Koch, 2004, 155, ff.) (The other is what has been called the 
“flashlight” form of attention in which we focus our attention—no matter how fragile—
on some particular aspect set over against an environment or against another event, or 
thing or state or process.)  The gist form of attention is then an integration having a unity 
that makes sense to each of us as ours alone and as one.  We have knit it together by each 
of our actions, responding as we saw fit in our emerging circumstances. 
The creation of the significance of our world as a matter of the gist it has for each 
of us is then a matter of integrating it as we live through our history and into our future; it 
is a matter of creating one whole of a life, at any moment, as we proceed along.  What 
counts as what fits together and as flowing aptly out of and into our history and future is 
very much a matter of the emotional responses we make as we proceed along; responses 
to situations and developments we find ourselves confronting.  Thus here is a different 
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form of reasoning—not a matter of marshalling evidence but a matter of fitting together 
into one integral whole a life of events and choices and undertakings personal to each of 
us; an integral whole our emotions regulate and have arranged as acceptable to us.  Here, 
checked and regulated by our emotional responses we create a meaningful flow and set of 
integrated moments and priorities.  Instead of a claim we have a gist or sense of our life at 
any moment, on the fly, as we proceed from history to future.  Instead of grounds and a 
warrant we have the history that we are accumulating and the sense of aptness, or 
integrality that our emotional response affords us to unfolding circumstances.  Here 
emotion is the gatekeeper of the future of the gist and significance of things in our life, 
just as cool reason is portrayed as the gatekeeper of claims cogently reached in our 
inferences.  Just as we can easily imagine intellectual virtues and vices at play in drawing 
inferences, so too we can easily imagine intellectual virtues and vices at play in drawing 
together a life, or in achieving a sensible integrality in our life.  Just as it is an 
oversimplification to see being a critical thinker as merely behaving in certain ways so as 
to draw conclusions cogently, so too, it is an oversimplification to see being a good 
integrative thinker merely in the form of achieving a coherent, but perhaps overly simple 
form of life.  (Siegel, 1999, 320,ff.)  And, just as we can see critical thinking, at the core 
of its practice and character, as social, so too we can see the appropriate integrative 
creation of the gist of our life as social in its root and branch. 
Thus emotion serves to integrate and regulate our lives, including our relations 
with others.  But, of course, in saying this I am only hinting at a suggestion of how 
emotion might play a pivotal role in a form of reasoning different from inference.  None 
of this is intended to do more than suggest that emotion and the social spheres into which 
it draws each of us is a source of rationality—though a source of a very different form of 
rationality than that achieved in critical thinking.  And, finally, none of this is intended to 
do more than hint at one thing Linda Carozza could be getting at by directing our 
attention away from the cognitive aspects of emotion in argumentation and toward 
emotion being part and parcel of the social sphere as it serves each of us in constructing 
the world.  Emotion as integrative must arrange not only the life each of us is living but 
also the life each of us is living with others.  And further, in our various interactions with 
others, for example in articulating our interests or intentions in discussion with another, 
we can come to better integrate our own life and relations with our interlocutor as well as 
with others.  Emotion plays as crucial an integrative role by lending assent or withholding 
it from a particular future with other centers of emotional integration as it does in lending 
assent or withholding it from a future emergent upon some personal undertaking or set of 





Might Carozza welcome these suggestions about emotion’s tie to a non-inferential form 
of argumentation?  Or is her concern solely with the social device of using ideal types of 
social style to analyze and interpret standard argumentation through emotionally revealed 
commitments?  I prefer to end with a different question:  is the suggestion of emotion as 
integrative one that does justice to an underlying aspect of Carozza’s paper?  There is 
much to be made of setting aside the cognitive and emphasizing the social in getting at 
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“the emotional aspects of argument.”  (Carozza, 2007, 6)  Also, there is much to be 
learned by turning to social psychological schemata of emotional style in order to 
understand the arguments of others (or even of self).  Indeed, I suggest that the point of 
invoking such schemata is made clear by understanding emotion as crucial to integrative 
argumentation.  Social styles are ideal types of how lives are integrated.  It is because of 
this that knowing these types lets us understand more of the epistemic commitments of 
those in standard, public, argumentative exchanges.  That is, the hidden integrative 
function of emotion explains how and why such devices as the social styles model 
“work” and are important to understanding standard argumentative exchanges.  Emotion 
as integrative explains emotion as cognitive in argumentation.  Thus, I believe, there is a 
single point in both setting aside the cognitive in favor of the social, and, of looking to 
what we might learn about the emotional organization of the life of those involved in 
argumentation.  Carozza’s fundamental lesson for us seems to concern the radical 
departure we need to make in our understanding of emotive argumentation generally, if 
we are to understand the roles of emotions within inferential argumentation more 
particularly. 
Finally, with Carozza, I have said nothing meant to challenge the progress many 
have given us in understanding the cognitive roles of emotion in argumentation.  But that 
said, what I have claimed and perhaps Carozza intends raises yet another set of problems 
and possibilities.  We need to think about the complementarity of the cognitive or 
epistemic roles of emotion in argumentation that seems inferential, with the roles emotion 
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